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I. INTRODUCTION
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which normally do not have lasting effects. The first step towards
building a long-term solution to corruption is to understand acts of
corruption as symptoms of a deeper problem in the relationship
between state and society in general and in the functioning of
democracy in particular.
The objective of this article is to insert the discussion of anticorruption policies within broader debates on accountability,
democracy, and human rights. In Part II, this article begins by
offering a new, expansive definition of accountability, which breaks
with minimalist, bureaucratic versions of the concept. It also address
the failings of elections as pro-accountability mechanisms and
derives from this discussion the need for the development of policy
strategies designed to directly attack corruption as such.
In Part III, this article then explores the diversity of proaccountability strategies available. Specifically, it examines the costs
and benefits of what I call “Weberian” and “marketization”
strategies, linked respectively to the “old” and “new” public
management approaches. It also explores innovative recent strategies
based on the creation of specialized independent agencies and the
development of “social accountability” initiatives.
In Part IV, this article defends the importance of society-based
approaches as a means to reinvigorate anti-corruption policy. It
examines the various dimensions along which such approaches can
vary and points out that not all civil society approaches are equally
effective. Many society-based initiatives can easily get trapped in the
same bureaucratic and legalistic traps as more traditional approaches.
This article argues that the best way to avoid this slippage is to
ground society-based strategies in a “human rights approach” to
development. Finally, it concludes with some general thoughts on the
broader challenges of anti-corruption strategies and their relationship
to the advancement of democracy and human rights.

II. CONSTRUCTING ACCOUNTABILITY
It is generally accepted that the best way to combat corruption and
thereby guarantee the public interest nature of the state is by
strengthening government accountability.1 But what exactly does this
1. ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (2001)
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concept mean? In its most literal sense, the term “account-ability”
means little more than the “ability” or the “possibility” that someone
or something can be “accounted for” or “counted up.”2 Under this
minimalist understanding, all that the accountability of government
would require is the most basic form of bookkeeping (for example,
this many miles of highway were built last year, this much money
was spent, this number of students attended public schools, etc.). It
might also require the existence of someone who could possibly view
the accounts if he or she so wished, a principle of “minimal
exposure” if you will, but not much else. Transparency, punishment,
performance, corruption, external surveillance, the public interest,
power, and principal-agent relationships are all left out of this basic
understanding of the concept of accountability.
Such a definition is clearly insufficient. Basic bookkeeping plus
minimal exposure are not powerful enough levers to generate
positive feedback cycles of expanding accountability. If my
colleague at the Public Works Ministry knows that I built 300 miles
of highway last year, would this in itself promote good governance?
What if my 300 miles were made out of below standard concrete?
What if the budget had called for me to build 1000 miles? What if
my colleague is actually my subordinate whose job depends on his
maintaining favor with me? Clearly we need a much more robust
definition of accountability for this term to do the work we expect of
it.
The conceptual task, therefore, is to build a workable definition of
accountability that has sufficient leverage and clarity so as to
(quoting Mark Moore of Harvard University and Margaret Gates, a consultant for
nonprofit agencies, who state that “corruption, arbitrariness, and inefficiency . . .
can be exorcized through mechanisms of accountability”); Mark Bovens, Public
Accountability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 182 (Ewan
Ferlie et al. eds., 2007) (conveying that public accountability enhances the integrity
of public governance providing safeguards against corruption and other forms of
inappropriate behavior); Sanjeev Khagram et al., Overview and Synthesis: The
Political Economy of Fiscal Transparency, Participation, and Accountability
Around the World, in OPEN BUDGETS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL
TRANSPARENCY, PARTICIPATION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 3 (Sanjeev Khagram et
al. eds., 2013) (maintaining that increased fiscal transparency and participation
lead to improved accountability resulting in reduced corruption).
2. See BEHN, supra note 1, at 4; Accountability Definition, MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
accountability?show=0&t=1382219724 (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
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irrefutably push towards good government and the rule of law.3 But
where should our conceptual construction project begin and where
should it end? The first element that most authors include is
punishment or sanction. As Robert Behn has argued, “Those whom
we want to hold accountable have a clear understanding of what
accountability means: Accountability means punishment.”4 Andreas
Schedler also incorporates this element into his definition of
accountability, including both answerability, or “the obligation of
public officials to inform about and to explain what they are doing”5
and enforcement, or “the capacity of accounting agencies to impose
sanctions on powerholders who have violated their public duties.”6
As we can see from this second definition, once we start building
in new elements to the concept, it is very difficult to resist the
temptation to push further. For instance, Schedler’s definition adds in
the key concepts of “information,” “explanation,” and “accounting
agencies.”7 Here the author encourages us to go beyond the relatively
passive requirement of minimal exposure to include a more proactive

3. See Steven Aftergood, An Inquiry into the Dynamics of Government
Secrecy, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 511, 511 (2013) (referring to President
Obama’s 2009 memorandum committing his administration to “creating an
unprecedented level of openness in Government” as an essential quality of good
government); Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and
Their Alternatives in the Pursuit of a Visible State, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 443, n.4
(2012) (commenting that the view that transparency is a subset of good
government dates back to the Progressive Era, when a social and political
movement led the charge for reforms to eradicate bureaucratic corruption,
especially at the municipal level); see also Dr. Amichai Magen, The Rule of Law
and Its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of Scope, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 51, 58–
59 (2009) (explaining that “the rule of law plays different roles in different types,
or phases, of domestic democratic development—from post-conflict state-building
to the opening of private spheres in autocratic regimes, and from ensuring free and
fair electoral transitions to the evolution of the institutional, regulatory, and
normative elements necessary for minimalist, illiberal democracies to mature into
effective, liberal ones”).
4. BEHN, supra note 1, at 3.
5. Andreas Schedler, Conceptualizing Accountability, in THE SELFRESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 14
(Andreas Schedler et al. eds., 1999).
6. See id.
7. See id. at 15 (asserting that accountability involves the right to receive
information and obligation to release all necessary details, and establishes a vocal
relationship between accountable and accounting actors).
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opening up on the part of public officials.8 It is not enough for
bureaucrats to leave their ledgers open on their desks so that
passersby can catch a glimpse of their reports. They must actively
inform and explain what they are doing and perhaps even justify why
in comprehensible language. In addition, Schedler’s reference to
accounting agencies introduces the element of the participation of an
external actor.9 For the author, it is not sufficient for the members of
a government agency to be in full communication with each other;
for accountability to exist there must also be a vigilant eye that gazes
in from the outside.10
Richard Mulgan’s definition of accountability emphasizes
precisely this external nature of the accountability relationship. He
argues that accountability includes three central elements: 1) “It is
external, in that the account is given to some other person or body
outside the person or body being held accountable”;11 2) “It involves
social interaction and exchange, in that one side, that calling for the
account, seeks answers and rectification while the other side, that
being held accountable, responds and accepts sanctions”;12 3) “It
implies rights of authority, in that those calling for an account are
asserting rights of superior authority over those who are
accountable.”13 This third element of Mulgan’s definition introduces
a crucial new element to our discussion: “superior authority.”14
According to Mulgan, accountability necessarily implies power.15
Only when the observer stands above the observed can we speak of
accountability. Indeed, following this line of thinking, other authors
8. See id. (positing that key to the accountability of government and public
officials is informing the public and explaining what they are doing).
9. Id. at 14, 18, 21.
10. Id. at 16 (referring to Taiwan and Nigeria’s need for independent
authorities to prosecute and impose sanctions on offending officials that would
otherwise escape investigation and prosecution because of their close relationship
with the ruling party).
11. Richard Mulgan, “Accountability”: An Ever-Expanding Concept?, 78
PUB. ADMIN., no. 3, 2000, at 555.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. “Superior authority” includes the right “to demand answers and to impose
sanctions” from “those who are accountable.” Id.
15. See id. at 563 (maintaining that institutions of accountability, such as
legislatures, statutory authorities, and the courts, exist to control or constrain
government power).
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argue that accountability can only exist as an element of a “principalagent relationship.”16 Might it be that we can only speak of
accountability when the actor being held accountable is directly at
the service of the actor calling for the account?
Although externality and superior authority are indeed often
important elements of accountability relationships, they are by no
means necessary for accountability to exist. “Internal” accountability
relationships are widespread, for instance within a sports team, a
government agency, or even a single individual.17 The coach of a
team evaluates players’ performance and rewards or punishes them
depending on the results, but so does each one of the players.
External audit agencies often hold government agencies accountable
for their actions, but so do fellow colleagues within a single ministry.
In the extreme case, can’t an individual hold herself accountable for
her own actions by, for instance, punishing herself if she fails to live
up to her own standards of work performance?
In addition, “horizontal” accountability relationships, between two
actors of equal authority, are common in all areas of life and
politics.18 Can’t one legislator hold another legislator accountable for
whether or not she upholds the party platform during her floor votes?
How about the relationship between an Ombudsman and an
executive agency or between two twin brothers? We should not
confuse sanctioning power with superior authority. The fact that I
can punish you does not necessarily mean that I am above you. My
punishment might be more effective if I am indeed in a superior
16. See Erika Moreno et al., The Accountability Deficit in Latin America, in
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA 79, 83 (Scott Mainwaring &
Christopher Welna eds., 2003) (contrasting the agency relationship, where the
principal has discretionary authority over the agent, with accountability, where the
authority runs from agent to principal).
17. See BEHN, supra note 1, at 1 (indicating that within the government exist
auditors, inspectors general, and independent counsel whose sole tasks are holding
other government officials accountable); Mulgan, supra note 11, at 556 (referring
to accountability as including an internal sense of responsibility and concern for
the public interest by public servants); Bovens, Public Accountability, supra note
1, at 184 (“[T]he actor, or accountor, can be either an individual or an agency.”).
18. See Mark Bovens, Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a
Virtue and as a Mechanism, 33 W. EUR. POL. 946, 956 (2010) (describing focus
groups, citizen panels, and independent external assessment of the activities of
public agencies as social forms of accountability that operate in a horizontal
fashion).
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position, but I can still observe, evaluate, and punish if we are
equals.19
Independently of how public servants are held accountable, what
can they be held accountable for? Here there are two broad schools
of thought. One wave equates accountability with honesty and rule
following.20 Public servants should be evaluated, rewarded, and
punished based on the extent to which they desist from corrupt and
illegal practices.21 This is an essentially “negative” and process-based
view of accountability insofar as it requires public servants only to
refrain from certain activities. A second wave defends the idea that
accountability also implies the affirmative task of effective
performance and pro-active decision-making.22 This perspective
points out that it is not very helpful for a public servant to follow the
rules and not accept bribes if her actions and decisions do not lead to
effective policy outcomes.23
19. This last argument should not, of course, be interpreted as an attempt to
weaken the strength or the relevance of those accountability relationships which
are indeed grounded in power relationships. For instance, according to classic
democratic theory, governments are accountable to the people because the citizens
are the original power holders who delegate authority temporarily, and over certain
specific issues, to the government. See Mulgan, supra note 11, at 555–56 (looking
to how accountability mechanisms function in a democratic state). This
understanding of the structure of democracy should ground all discussions of
accountability. Nevertheless, when we limit our understanding exclusively to this
framework we risk missing a great variety of other relationships that can be
equally important for strengthening government accountability.
20. See Melanie Manion, Excerpts from Corruption by Design: Building Clean
Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong, in 4 PUBLIC SECTOR
CORRUPTION 29, 30–31 (Michael Johnston ed., 2010) (discussing mechanisms of
clean government as including clean officials who adhere to and enforce the rules
associated with anti-corruption).
21. Peter N. Grabosky, Citizen Co-Production and Corruption Control, in 4
PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION 49, 53 (Michael Johnston ed., 2010) (explaining how
some nations’ independent inspection organizations warn officials about
violations, may impose reprimands, order an officer’s dismissal, and recover
damages arising from official misfeasance).
22. See Samuel Paul, Accountability in Public Services: Exit, Voice and
Control, 20 WORLD DEV. 1047, 1055–56 (1992) (describing consulting
participants in public hearings or advisory panels as one possible method for
improved decision-making); see also BEHN, supra note 1, at 9–10 (stating that the
goal of government is to “accomplish public purposes” and therefore, what it
actually accomplishes is important in the accountability context).
23. See BEHN, supra note 1, at 10 (conveying that what are important are the
consequences of government action, such as change in policies, programs, and
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The temporal dimension is another important aspect of
accountability.24 Specifically, are there such things as “ex-ante” or
“simultaneous” accountability, or is all accountability necessarily expost? In the strictest sense, accountability can only be exercised after
the fact. Since accountability involves the evaluation of the behavior
of public servants, it is senseless to speak of evaluating something
that does not already exist. Nevertheless, this truth should not lead us
to conclude that public servants can only be held accountable for
completed projects or “results.” For instance, an agent of
accountability does not need to wait until the highway is already
built to ask for information and explanations and evaluate the
answers given. How was the strategic plan developed? How are the
workers organized at the construction site? How do the engineers
respond to unexpected circumstances? For the purpose of conceptual
clarity, we can use the term “ex-post” accountability to refer to the
evaluation of completed projects, the term “ex-ante” accountability
to refer to the evaluation of plans of action and the term
“simultaneous” accountability to refer to the evaluation of ongoing
government initiatives.
For those who might have doubts about the existence of ex-ante
accountability mechanisms, the Administrative Procedure Act and
National Environmental Policy Act in the United States are excellent
examples.25 Before agencies can put new regulations into effect they
are required to give complete information as to their content, justify
them, and even defend them in court if questioned by civil society
groups or individuals with legal standing.26 Such accountability
mechanisms can be criticized for unnecessarily slowing down
public services).
24. Ernesto Isunza Vera, Para Analizar Los Procesos De Democratización:
Interfaces Socioestatales, Proyectos Políticos y Rendición de Cuentas, in
DEMOCRATIZACIÓN, RENDICIÓN DE CUENTAS Y SOCIEDAD CIVIL: PARTICIPACIÓN
CIUDADANA Y CONTROL SOCIAL 265, 283–87 (Ernesto Isunza Vera & Alberto J.
Olvera coords., 2006).
25. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966) (“A person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof.”); National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2000) (requiring
federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their activities before
implementing proposals).
26. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966); National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2000).

2014]

RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION

301

government action, as agencies spend significant time and resources
justifying their plans and responding to criticisms, but this is a very
different point from affirming that such forms are not accountability
relationships at all.27
An additional central element of the accountability equation is to
understand that it is a process and not a state. To “be accountable” is
to be in motion, not simply sitting in an office “open to criticism.”
To “be accountable” is to work with society and accounting agencies
to improve government honesty and performance instead of doing
one’s best to hide from scrutiny.28 The pro-active behavior that
accountability demands requires dialogue, explanation, and
justification.29
One other important distinction present in the literature is that
between accountability and responsiveness.30 Some scholars argue
that there is a radical split between these two concepts, that
responding to the demands of citizens is very different from being
accountable to them.31 For instance, Bernard Manin, Adam
Przeworski, and Susan Stokes have claimed that “a government is
‘responsive’ if it adopts policies that are signaled as preferred by
citizens,”32 while “governments are ‘accountable’ if citizens can
27. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 127 (1995)
(“Although judicial review is criticized in the United States as time-consuming and
ineffective . . . it has the advantage of explicitly requiring that political and policy
decisions of agencies should be accountable to citizens.”).
28. Id. at 126–27 (recommending other nations look to the United States’
method of requiring public notice, a rulemaking process that includes participation
by public participants, and a judicial-review clause of the American Administrative
Procedure Act in adopting regulations as a way to maintain legitimacy).
29. This, of course, does not mean that different sorts of pro-activity are equal
from a moral or a political point of view. For instance, it is quite different for a
public servant to pro-actively inform and dialogue with her superior, an
international agency, a large corporation, or a civil society group. Although each
would consolidate her accountability to the respective actor, our evaluation of each
type of accountability will depend on the importance that we place on the
respective “agent of accountability.”
30. Bernard Manin et al., Introduction to DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY,
AND REPRESENTATION 1, 8–10 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999).
31. Id. (stating that “responsiveness” deals with the relationship between
signals and policies while “accountability” deals with the relationship between
outcomes and sanctions).
32. Id. at 9.
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discern representative from unrepresentative governments and can
sanction them appropriately, retaining in office those incumbents
who perform well and ousting from office those who do not.”33 The
problem with such a radical distinction is that it conceptualizes
government as an entity that citizens “alienate” or throw up into the
air at each election and then try to discipline or control at the next.34
From this perspective, accountability can only be exercised
externally and ex-post. Citizens are only empowered to sanction the
government after it has “performed” by changing their vote during
periodic elections.35
In contrast, I propose envisioning government as a part of the
polity itself, not an external actor that the citizens lift up above them
and then try to control after the fact. This alternative
conceptualization of government envisions a constant give and take
between state and society and the exercise of accountability both
before and during the exercise of public authority.36 Here
“responsiveness” and “accountability” are still two different
concepts, the former referring to the motivation for an action or
decision and the latter referring to the quality of the action or
decision itself. Nevertheless, they are inextricably linked since a
government that opens itself up fully to scrutiny and sanction before,
during, and after it acts will usually also take very seriously the
interests and demands of citizens.37
The above discussion brings us to settle on a definition of
accountability that includes pro-active behaviors like information
and justification, the evaluation of performance in addition to rulefollowing, the calling to account before, during, and after decisions

33. Id. at 10.
34. See Schedler, supra note 5, at 18 (observing that the idea of electoral
accountability is characterized by punishing past behavior as voters do when
holding politicians accountable at periodic elections).
35. See Manin et al., supra note 30, at 10.
36. John Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond “Exit” and
“Voice”, 32 WORLD DEV. 447, 455 (2004) [hereinafter Ackerman, Co-Governance
for Accountability] (referring to the success of past reforms as depending on the
ability of the government to involve social actors from the beginning of the
regulatory design phase).
37. See id. at 451 (describing the success of Porto Alegre, Brazil’s
accountability arrangement as encouraging active participation by any adult to
attend, speak, advise, and vote in the assemblies).
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are made, and, of course, the application of sanctions (both positive
and negative).38 We can therefore define accountability as a proactive process by which public officials inform about and justify their
plans of action, their behavior, and results, and are sanctioned
accordingly.39 Figure 1 below summarizes the discussion of
accountability up to this point:
Figure 1: The Core Elements of Accountability
Performance

Rewards
Punishment
Public
Officials &
Government
Agencies
Object of
Accountability

Action Plans
Behavior
Information
Explanation

Citizens, Public
Officials &
Accountability
Agencies
Agent of
Accountability

Rule-Following

But why worry about accountability as a specific target of
intervention? Aren’t free and fair elections enough? Citizens elect
representatives and then supposedly hold them accountable for their
behavior at the following election. The representatives in turn
appoint and hold bureaucrats and the members of the judicial branch
accountable for their behavior. Such an “accountability chain” is
supposed to assure good government and the rule of law since the
38. See Paul, supra note 22, at 1054.
39. See generally Schedler, supra note 5; Manin et al., supra note 30.
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jobs of all public officials ultimately depend on the popular vote.40
Unfortunately, research has shown that the accountability that
public officials are exposed to through the celebration of periodic
elections is just not enough to guarantee good government and the
rule of law.41 There are three central problems with elections as
accountability mechanisms. First, there is a profound problem of
information asymmetry both between elected officials and the
electorate and between bureaucrats and elected officials.42 It is
simply impossible for citizens to be aware of each and every decision
that an elected representative makes, or for an elected representative
to be aware of every act performed by unelected public servants. 43
Add to this the media’s consistent manipulation of information and
the ability for both elected and unelected officials to intentionally
hide important facts, and the interference present in the
accountability chain becomes formidable.44 Instead of a crystal clear
fiber-optic line of communication between public officials and
citizens, we have something more like a garbled telegram that can be
deciphered in multiple ways. Under such circumstances the “moral
hazard problem” raises its ugly head.45 Why would a bureaucrat
40. Manin et al., supra note 30, at 10 (“Elections are a ‘contingent renewal’
accountability mechanism, where the sanctions are to extend or not to extend the
government’s tenure.”).
41. See id. at 12; Larry Diamond et al., Introduction to SELF-RESTRAINING
STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES, 1, 12 (Andreas
Schedler, et al. eds., 1999) (“[E]lections . . . are by themselves too weak to
guarantee ‘decent’ government.”); see also STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY,
COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR 7–8
(2010) (pointing out the potential for fraud in the election process).
42. Manin et al., supra note 30, at 12 (asserting that governments may act
based on opinion polls, rather than on direct voter communication, to be more
“responsive” than “representative”).
43. See id. at 10–11 (stating that information may be too costly or impossible
to obtain, making it difficult for the government to be both fully responsive and
fully representative).
44. See EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING
CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA xii (1988) (discussing
censorship and how it is used to shape the media).
45. See Manin et al., supra note 30, at 12 (“[W]hen governments know what
voters will be satisfied with and voters do not know what governments can do for
them, room is opened for moral hazard.”); see also Shaila Dewan, Moral Hazard:
A Temptest-Tossed Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2012, at BU1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/business/moral-hazard-as-the-flip-side-ofself-reliance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (defining “moral hazard” as “the undue
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follow the dictates of an elected official or an elected official the
dictates of the citizens if it is much easier and more lucrative to take
advantage of the communication breakdown and follow one’s own
interests and agenda?
The second problem with elections as accountability mechanisms
is that they only operate ex-post. As discussed above, such
monitoring and enforcement after the fact is indeed an important type
of accountability.46 Nevertheless, it is only one part of the larger
accountability landscape. Insofar as we conceptualize government as
something that should be in constant contact with the public, we need
to imagine and to construct ex-ante and simultaneous accountability
mechanisms as well. If the public relies exclusively on ex-post
accountability, it effectively “alienates” its voice by delegating its
authority entirely during the periods between elections.47 This
arrangement would not be a problem if the government were
occupied by perfectly honest politicians and civil servants with
whom we agree on all issues, but in the real world it is important to
maintain a significant connection between citizens and government
to prevent public officials from behaving as short-term dictators
between elections.48
Third, elections only allow citizens to exercise accountability
externally, from “outside” of government. Elections are grounded in
a clear split between state and society. Citizens send representatives
to the capital through their vote, but do not participate themselves in
the tasks of government. Representatives may consult the public
before making decisions, and the public may change its vote in the
next election, but it is excluded from playing a direct role in
risks that people are apt to take if they don’t have to bear the consequences”).
46. See Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 55,
60–61 (1994) (conveying that under a representative democracy, voters hold
elected officials accountable vertically, and outside institutions hold them
accountable horizontally, by “call[ing] into question, and eventually punish[ing],
improper ways of discharging [their] responsibilities”).
47. See id. at 65–66 (explaining that if elected officials are not answerable for
their actions in between elections, it opens the door for elected officials to “[say]
one thing during the campaign and [do] the contrary when in office”); see also
Schedler, supra note 5, at 18 (noting that periodic elections allow voters to hold
elected officials accountable, but in between elections, “incumbents may
continually disclose their actions and justify them” without immediate recourse).
48. See Schedler, supra note 5, at 19 (discussing the role that “agencies of
accountability” play in reigning in power).
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decision-making.49 Under formalistic representative democracy,
excluding a more “participate version,” citizens normally do not have
any concrete authority over government.50
The above three problems are intimately connected in an
interlocking negative feedback loop (see Figure 2 below). First, since
citizens are external to government, it is much more difficult for
them to have access to adequate information and to exercise
accountability in anything other than an ex-post fashion.51 Second,
citizens’ lack of information prevents them from effectively
exercising ex-ante or simultaneous accountability or participating
directly in the tasks of government.52 Third, the limitation to ex-post
accountability makes citizens feel that they are unimportant for the
functioning of government, thus minimizing the number and force of
citizen demands for information and inclusion.53
Figure 2: The Triple Failure of Electoral Democracy
Ex-Post
Accountability

Information
Asymmetries

“External”
Accountability

49. See O’Donnell, supra note 46, at 55, 60–61 (stating that voters become a
passive audience of their representative following an election).
50. See Manin et al., supra note 30, at 3 (“While citizens are free to discuss,
criticize, and demand at all times, they are not able to give legally binding
instructions to the government.”).
51. See id. at 24 (describing the British government barring independent
researchers from accessing tissue extracted from cows suffering from mad cow
disease during the mad cow disease outbreak).
52. See id. at 10–11 (“If people are not certain about . . . the effect of policies
on outcomes, then they cannot be sure which policies are in their best interest or
how much they can expect from the government.”).
53. See id. at 6.
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III. CATEGORIES OF PRO-ACCOUNTABILITY
REFORM
The celebration of free and fair elections is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the establishment of good governance and the
rule of law.54 Democracy needs to be complemented with reforms
explicitly designed to improve government accountability. 55 There
are four general categories of pro-accountability reform: “Weberian
reform,” “marketization,” “independent agencies,” and “social
accountability.” This section outlines the nature of each one of these
strategies in turn. Although each category summarizes a distinct way
of approaching pro-accountability reform, the categories are by no
means mutually exclusive. Indeed, in practice the best strategy is
usually to combine various approaches to have the maximum
impact.56 For instance, there is no contradiction in simultaneously
strengthening bureaucracy along Weberian lines and opening up the
doors of government to practices of social accountability. Indeed,
when initiatives are well designed these two types of strategies can
create synergies, which make the whole much more than a sum of
the parts.57
Max Weber understood bureaucracy to be the institutionalization
of rationality in which each public servant had a specific task to carry
out and was fully accountable for her actions to her superior. 58 This
understanding created a vertically integrated triangle with power
54. See Diamond et al., supra note 41, at 2 (explaining that despite how
competitive free and fair elections may be, they do not guarantee a decent
government).
55. See id. at 1 (suggesting that governments should exercise self-restraint and
also be subject to external restraint and oversight to ameliorate government
accountability).
56. See Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 448
(describing the importance of combining answerability and enforcement processes
to establish the accountability of public officials).
57. See generally id. at 458 (arguing that “active involvement of civil society
and the strengthening of the state apparatus are not mutually exclusive,” but that
co-governance requires active participation by both the government and society).
58. See James Pfiffner, Traditional Public Administration Versus the New
Public Management: Accountability Versus Efficiency, in INSTITUTIONENBILDUNG
IN REGIERUNG UND VERWALTUNG: FESTSCHRIFT FUR KLAUS KONIG 443, 443 (A.
Benz et al. eds., 2004) (discussing Weber’s emphasis on “monocratic hierarchy,”
where “policy is set at the top” and the “role of the bureaucrat is strictly
subordinate to the political supervisor”).
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concentrated at the top in which “good governance” is guaranteed
through careful supervision and the rational organization of the tasks
of government.59
This ideal type60 of bureaucracy dominated the field of public
administration and public management for most of the twentieth
century.61 Indeed, up to the present day, it is viewed as particularly
important for scholars and practitioners in the developing world
where the government apparatus is weak and the state is still not
consolidated.62 A solid, rationally organized government is seen as
the first line of attack against corruption, clientelism, and capture.
Unfortunately, in the contemporary world of “flexible
government” the strengthening of the command-and-control
functions of government has fallen out of favor with many.63
Nevertheless, such “old” public management strategies—like civil
service reform and the improvement of internal auditing, evaluation,
and surveillance—are absolutely central elements of any proaccountability reform package.64 If the central administrative
apparatus does not have sufficient strength and legitimacy to control
its own employees other pro-accountability reforms will surely fail.65
59. See PAUL DU GAY, IN PRAISE OF BUREAUCRACY: WEBER, ORGANIZATION,
ETHICS 44 (2000) (depicting bureaucracy as a “procedural, technical and
hierarchical organization” where personal convictions must be set aside “to the
diktats of procedural decision-making”).
60. Weber’s “ideal typical” bureaucrat is an expression of the essential
characteristics of social forms and does not necessarily reflect the reality of
particular existing cases.
61. See DONALD F. KETTL, THE GLOBAL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVOLUTION:
A REPORT ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE 6, 67–68 (2000).
62. Id. (“For political and administrative transformations to succeed,
[developing nations] must frequently build new social structures, legal systems,
and market arrangements.”).
63. See LAWRENCE LYNN, JR., PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: OLD AND NEW 173
(2006) (noting how Guy Peters’ state development models show that certain causes
for bureaucratic dissatisfaction lead to different types of reform: centralized power
reforms into a market system; hierarchy changes into a participatory government;
inertia creates a flexible government; and over-regulation leads to regulation).
64. See id. at 110–11 (describing the Clinton administration’s movement
towards creating a smaller, cheaper, and more effective government by focusing on
cutting red tape, putting the public first, and decentralizing decision-making power
empowering employees to get results).
65. See id. at 176–77 (explaining that even with a lack of resources, public
administration should be capable of planning, management, organization, and basic
functions).
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One of the most popular recent waves of public administration
reforms emphasizes both the privatization of public services and the
imitation of private sector management techniques by government.66
These two strategies are analytically and empirically distinct. 67 It is
one thing for the government to sell off government monopolies and
it is quite another for the government to run itself like a business.
Nevertheless, both strategies look to improve the accountability of
service provision by introducing the discipline of the market and can
go together under the name of “Marketization.”68 Privatization
introduces the market in a single act while strategies such as
managed competition, subcontracting, deregulation of government
procedures, and flexiblization of government labor markets,
introduce market behavior in a more piecemeal and indirect
fashion.69 Such reforms involve society as an aggregation of
consumers who can punish or reward service providers depending on
their effectiveness.
The functioning of the market here can sometimes serve as a
powerful pro-accountability mechanism. However, it can also make
accountability problems much worse by excluding public services
from citizen oversight and transparency requirements.70 Furthermore,
marketization should not be confused with social accountability, to
be discussed below. Although both strategies look to tap into the
energy of society to improve accountability, each reform strategy has
66. See MICHAEL BARZELAY, THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: IMPROVING
RESEARCH AND POLICY DIALOGUE 75 (2001) (providing England under Prime
Minister Thatcher as an example of a nation that aimed to limit private sector
management by divisionalizing government departments; for example agency
chiefs acted like general managers who were accountable for their divisions’
performance, and ministers were like corporate CEOs who mainly did output
control).
67. See KETTL, supra note 61, at 1–2 (2000) (admitting, however, that both
seek to change how managers run their programs by using influential market
strategies).
68. See id.
69. See generally LYNN, supra note 63, at 178 (observing that managerialism
often leads to long delegation chains that are counterproductive to accountability
goals).
70. See John M. Ackerman & Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, Information
Regulation: Controlling the Flow of Information to and from Administrative
Agencies: the Global Explosion of Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L.
REV. 85, 88 (2006) (describing the obligation citizens have to monitor the conduct
of governmental organizations and to make sure public programs run properly).
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a very different logic. While marketization seeks to send sections of
the state off to society, social accountability seeks to invite society
into the state. While marketization is grounded in the discourse of
consumer protection and consumer choice, social accountability is
based in the language of citizens’ rights and empowerment.71
Social accountability also has a few important advantages over
marketization since it retains central government control over service
provision. First, social accountability retains the comparative
advantage that the state has over the market in the provision of public
goods, natural monopolies, basic necessities, and goods that require
long-term planning and development. Second, since the state is still
in control it keeps transaction costs to the minimum by permitting
the focused coordination of multiple programs with parallel goals.
When public services are broken down and sold off or sub-contracted
out, this tends to significantly increase transaction costs. Using social
accountability instead of marketization allows for the advantages of
centralized coordination without the disadvantages of overbureaucratization. Third, it avoids the inequality-producing effects of
market-based service delivery and caters to inclusion and social
justice more directly.
State reformers should remember that the New Public
Management (“NPM”) can be applied in a wide variety of ways. As
B. Guy Peters has pointed out, NPM is a catchall term that actually
holds within it four different models of government: “market
government,” “participative government,” “flexible government,”
and “deregulated government.”72 Pro-accountability entrepreneurs
should think twice before assuming that marketization is the best and
only way to apply the NPM. Careful attention needs to be given to
the type of good or service being provided, the increase in
transaction costs marketization might provoke, the possible loss of
strength in the accountability signal when “citizens” are replaced
with “consumers,” and the potential for increases in inequality that
can arise from marketization. In the end, the “participative” model of
the NPM frequently can be even more effective than the “market,”

71. See id. at 108 (explaining that accountability demands more than just
giving citizens access to reports—accountability requires governmental
organizations to justify their conduct in plain language).
72. See B. GUY PETERS, THE FUTURE OF GOVERNING 21 (2001).
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“flexible,” or “deregulation” models.73
One of the most popular pro-accountability reforms in recent years
has been the creation of Independent Pro-Accountability Agencies
(“IPAs”).74 IPAs are autonomous public institutions that are
responsible for holding government accountable in a specific issue
area. Examples include autonomous corruption control bodies,
independent electoral institutes, auditing agencies, human rights
ombudsmen, and “public prosecutors.”75 In recent years, there has
been a veritable explosion in the creation of such institutions in the
developing world.76 In Latin America, Belize, Brazil, Columbia,
Costa Rica, Chile, Peru, and Mexico have all created or revived one
or more such independent institutions in the last decade.77 This trend
is also present in Asia, Africa, Australia, and Eastern Europe.78
Some countries have distinguished themselves as especially
innovative cases in the creation of new pro-accountability
institutions. Thailand’s 1997 constitution created seven different
such institutions: the National Counter Corruption Commission, an
independent electoral commission, an ombudsman, a constitutional
court, an administrative court, an environmental review board
responsible for evaluating the environmental impact of public
projects, and a consumer review board which involves consumer

73. See id. at 50 (noting that pursuant to the participative model of reform, the
government should be responsible for finding out what the public wants and how
to deliver results).
74. See Carmen Alpín-Lardiés & Mario Classen, Conclusion to SOCIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY IN AFRICA: PRACTITIONERS’ EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS 212
(Carmen Alpín-Lardiés & Mario Classen eds., 2010) (acknowledging that two
other popular accountability reforms are social accountability and public sector
reform).
75. See JONATHAN FOX, ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICS: POWER AND VOICE IN
RURAL MEXICO 35 (2007) (explaining that these new institutions of horizontal
accountability complement the legislatures, judiciaries, and sub-national
governments already in existence).
76. John Ackerman, Understanding Independent Accountability Agencies, in
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 265 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L.
Lindseth eds., 2010).
77. See id. at 265 n.3 (noting that there has been an increase in constitution
courts and regulatory agencies, and providing Mexico as an example to
demonstrate how the development of IPAs has been an effective in improving
bureaucratic performance).
78. See id.
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representatives in the design of consumer protection laws.79 Hungary
is another fascinating case insofar as it has recently established four
different ombudsmen, one for human rights protection, a second for
national and ethnic minorities, a third for data protection and
freedom of information, and a fourth for education.80 In Latin
America, the new constitutions of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia
radically redefine the division of powers.81 Other examples include
the Chilean Contralor,82 the Peruvian Ombudsman,83 the Brazilian
Ministerio Público,84 and the flurry of new agencies recently created
by the Mexican government.85
The performance of IPAs varies widely between countries. In
many countries there is a long tradition of creating new
“independent” bureaucracies in response to problems to make the
government appear as if it were committed to resolving the issue at
hand, whether it be corruption, human rights violations, free and fair

79. See Danny Unger, Principals of the Thai State, in REINVENTING
LEVIATHAN: THE POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 181, 196–97 (Ben Ross Schneider & Blanca Heredia eds., 2003)
(describing the path-breaking changes in the Thai Constitution that now require
government agencies to provide information, explanations, and rationales for
policies affecting citizens’ individual rights).
80. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, FROM ELECTIONS TO DEMOCRACY: BUILDING
ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT IN HUNGARY AND POLAND 80 (2005).
81. See John Ackerman, Estado Democrático, Rendición de Cuentas y
Organismos Autónomos en América Latina, in AMÉRICA LATINA: DEMOCRACIA,
ECONOMÍA Y DESARROLLO SOCIAL 91, 97–99 (Gregorio Vidal & Omar de León
eds., 2010).
82. See Peter M. Siavelis, Disconnected Fire Alarms and Ineffective Police
Patrols: Legislative Oversight in Postauthoritarian Chile, 42 J. INTERAM. STUD. &
WLD. AFF. 71, 72 (2000) (noting that before the military regime took over in 1973,
Chilean IPAs were considered above party politics).
83. Charles D. Kenney, Reflections on Horizontal Accountability: Democratic
Legitimacy, Majority Parties and Democratic Stability in Latin America, at n.13,
Draft prepared for the Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of
Notre Dame Conference on Institutions, Accountability, and Democratic
Governance in Latin America (May 8–9, 2000), available at
http://kellogg.nd.edu/faculty/research/pdfs/Kenney.pdf (commenting that the
Peruvian Ombudsman’s Office has come to enjoy a degree of legitimacy due, in
part, to the leadership of Jorge Santistevan de Noriega).
84. See generally ROGÉRIO BASTOS ARANTES, MINISTERIO PÚBLICO E
POLÍTICA NO BRASIL (2002).
85. See Ackerman, Understanding Independent Accountability Agencies,
supra note 76, at 267 n.3.
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elections, etc.86 Such institutional innovations often successfully
deflect criticism from the central bureaucracy, thereby permitting the
government to avoid a full reform of the state.87 The transparency
and openness to participation also varies widely between IPAs. For
instance, while ombudsmen tend to be open and to provide much
needed information to the public, auditing agencies tend to be much
more closed-lipped.88
My own research shows that there is a direct relationship between
the effectiveness of IPAs and the level and intensity of their
interaction with society.89 Those IPAs that take their role as bridges
seriously are the ones that fulfill their mandates more effectively,
while those that separate themselves from either the government or
society tend to end in isolation and ineffectiveness.90 Here, we see
that so called “horizontal” and “vertical” accountability cannot be so
easily separated. The strength of government accounting agencies
depends on their connection with society at large, which leads us to
the question of social accountability.
Governments can do a great deal on their own to improve
accountability through actions such as strengthening top-down
oversight, professionalizing staff through civil service reform,
empowering internal comptrollers, establishing performance
contracts, and creating new independent public oversight agencies.91
Nevertheless, pro-accountability reform is much more effective when
86. See Michael Dodson & Donald W. Jackson, Horizontal Accountability and
the Rule of Law in Central America, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN LATIN
AMERICA 228, 229 (Scott Mainwaring & Christopher Welna eds., 2003)
(explaining that a “political democracy” upholds the citizens’ guaranteed rights,
and makes sure no one is above the law, including the elected officials).
87. See id.
88. See Frederick Uggla, The Ombudsman in Latin America, 36 J. LAT. AM.
STUD. 423, 424–25 (2004) (distinguishing ombudsmen from prosecutors and
accounting offices because ombudsmen can create resolutions from citizens’
complaints relatively cheaply).
89. See John Ackerman, Organismos Autónomos y la Nueva División de
Poderes en México y América Latina, INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES JURÍDICAS
DE LA UNAM 12, 16–21, available at http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/6/2834/
5.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Ackerman, Organismos Autónomos].
90. Id.
91. But see Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at
447 (noting that both old public management strategies, such as civil service
reform, and new public management strategies, such as managed competition and
performance contracts, isolate the public from state activities).
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societal actors play a central role as well.92 There are a great variety
of initiatives that fall under this category. Initiatives as different as
participatory budgeting, administrative procedures acts, and social
audits, all involve citizens in the oversight and control of government
and therefore can be considered social accountability initiatives.93
Here we give a brief overview of this category of pro-accountability
reform.
The universe of government action is so broad that it is virtually
impossible to oversee the entirety of the operation.94 Comptrollers
can only perform a limited number of audits. Human rights
ombudsmen can only respond to a certain number of complaints.
Legislatures can only follow up on a specific number of government
programs. Budgets can be expanded and powers can be extended, but
the infinite detail of government behavior will always escape the
view of the overseer. There is no single all-seeing “god’s eye” point
of view from which to control the government apparatus.
It is therefore necessary to complement such top-down “police
patrol” oversight strategies with bottom-up “fire alarm”
mechanisms.95 For Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz,
“police patrol” oversight is the traditional modality in which
supervisory agencies operate, trying to keep a constant eye on those
they are supposed to monitor.96 To the contrary, “fire alarm”
92. See CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS
CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 216–17 (2009) (noting activist
movements of the 1960s which put pressure on bureaucracies to make certain
administrative processes open to public accountability, such as police disciplinary
procedures).
93. See Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 450–
51, 457 (commenting that administrative procedure acts and referendum laws help
make the government and its elected officials accountable to the public that voted
for them, and that participatory budgeting is also an important accountability
concept because it allows citizens to help plan where the government should spend
public funds; in doing so it reduces the incentives for corruption and the political
use of public funds).
94. See id. at 449 (specifying that the major difficulty is in monitoring the
exorbitant amount of governmental communications, actions, and inactions).
95. See generally Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165
(1984).
96. See id. at 165–66 (explaining that police patrol oversight is more
centralized than fire alarm oversight, and it involves Congress studying a sample
of agency activities to detect violations and provide remedies).
AND THE
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oversight occurs when an agency relies on external actors to detect
when there are problems (to sound the alarm) and then focuses its
attention particularly carefully on those areas that require extra
attention.97 While a roving police car might happen to come upon a
burglar or a burning building, society is everywhere. Indeed,
according to Catalina Smulovitz, this gives society an extra plus.98
Since society is everywhere, it does not even have to act in all cases
to make its presence felt. The mere threat that society might sound
the alarm or respond in other more disruptive ways is often enough
to control public servants.99
Unfortunately, although society is omnipresent it is often quite
dormant. Indeed, the capacity of onlookers to not intervene to resolve
problems is well known, particularly in highly modernized, urban
areas.100 Numerous examples exist of circles of curious passersby
who do little or nothing to help victims of accidents, heart attacks, or
theft. In addition, civil society is not always as “pure” as it is often
made out to be.101 Any power that is given to society risks being coopted by criminal organizations and powerful interest groups, who
only look for personal and group benefits.102
Society is a powerful potential force for strengthening government
accountability. Nevertheless, this force does not come alive
automatically or always in the most productive forms. 103 Pro97. See id.
98. See Catalina Smulovitz, How Can the Rule of Law Rule? Cost Imposition
Through Decentralized Mechanisms, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 168,
171 (José María Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds., 2003) (arguing that having
many “decentralized external eyes” increases the amount of people interested in
enforcing the rule of law).
99. See id. at 172 (explaining that “decentralization allows for a ‘fire alarm’
type of control,” providing a piecemeal approach to control transgressions to the
rule of law).
100. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 95, at 168 (implying that lack of
violation reporting in a fire alarm system may lead to less oversight because
congressmen would not be motivated by their constituents).
101. See generally Smulovitz, supra note 98, at 168–69 (indicating that citizens
will only follow the laws if the penalties for breaking them are costly).
102. See id. at 169 (explaining that when the government does not follow the
rule of law, it can gain support from the criminal organizations or interest groups
that benefit from the its illegal conduct).
103. See id. at 169–70 (suggesting that when some citizens find it beneficial to
not hold their government accountable, the rule of law cannot become selfenforcing; the key to sustaining a self-enforcing rule of law is a “consensus of
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accountability reformers need to design mechanisms that both help
translate this potentiality into action and privilege social actors that
work for the public interest. Context is absolutely crucial. There is no
single “silver bullet” or special recipe for creating successful social
accountability initiatives. As this article will show below, the best
strategy will always depend on the social and political context.

IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
What has come to be called the “human rights based approach” to
development offers a good starting point for undergirding a solid
commitment to social accountability in anti-corruption policy.104 The
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCR”)
understands this as an approach that “links poverty reduction to
questions of obligation, rather than welfare or charity.”105 The British
Department for International Development (“DFID”) defines this
approach as “empowering people to take their own decisions, rather
than being the passive objects of choices made on their behalf.”106
The World Bank has also claimed that “social accountability is a
right” and that such initiatives are grounded in “a new manifestation
of citizenship based on the right to hold governments accountable by
expanding people’s responsibility.”107
values” that allow citizens to act together).
104. See Frequently Asked Questions on a Human Rights-Based Approach to
Development Cooperation, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RIGHTS
9–10
(2006),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQen.pdf
[hereinafter OHCHR, Frequently Asked Questions] (explaining that human rights
can provide standards against which the public can hold the government
accountable and arguing that human rights promotes the rule of law and
encourages public participation in governance).
105. See Human Rights and Poverty Reduction: A Conceptual Framework,
OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RIGHTS iii (2003),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/PovertyReductionen.pdf
(discussing that the foundation for a human rights based approach to poverty
reduction is in international law and government accountability is critical to
supporting human rights).
106. See Realising Human Rights for Poor People, DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV. 7
(2000), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/development/docs/human_rights_tsp
.pdf (explaining that the organization’s goal is to have poor people’s ideas and
perspectives directly influence the laws and policy created for their betterment).
107. See From Shouting to Counting: A New Frontier in Social Development,
THE WORLD BANK SOC. DEV. DEP’T. 2 (last visited Nov. 1, 2013),
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The core objective of the human rights approach to development is
to invert the power relationships between service providers and the
poor.108 Instead of envisioning development as a process by which
governments, foundations, or international agencies channel
resources to help excluded groups overcome poverty and suffering,
the human rights approach starts by acknowledging the entitlements
of the poor.109 As a result, according to this perspective, “service
providers” are better conceptualized as “duty-bearers.”110 It is their
obligation, not their choice, to guarantee the human rights of the
poor, the “rights-holders.”111
This approach gives a very different taste to development. As
Andrea Cornwall has argued, instead of talking about “beneficiaries
with needs” or “consumers with choices” the human rights approach
speaks of “citizens with rights.”112 Citizens are active subjects in the
political sphere, not objects of intervention by government programs
or passive choosers in the marketplace.
Citizenship necessarily implies empowerment and the active
participation of the poor in the design, control, oversight, and
evaluation of the development projects that affect them. Indeed,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPCENG/214574-1116506074750/
20511078/Social+Accountability+Booklet+Feb+26+04.pdf.
108. See Philip C. Aka, Analyzing U.S. Commitment to Socioeconomic Human
Rights, 39 AKRON L. REV. 417, 442 (2006) (describing various NGOs’, such as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, commitment to promoting social
and economic justice on a global scale).
109. See William R. O’Neill, S.J., Commonweal or Woe? The Ethics of Welfare
Reform, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 487, 489 (1997) (listing basic
entitlements including welfare rights to nutritional well-being, health care, or
employment opportunities).
110. See Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor: New
Governance, New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of
Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 92 (2010) (arguing that there is an
international duty of states to ensure that their regulatory systems are designed to
recognize human rights across social sectors).
111. See id.; O’Neill, supra note 109, at 489.
112. See ANDREA CORNWALL, BENEFICIARY, CONSUMER, CITIZEN:
PERSPECTIVES ON PARTICIPATION FOR POVERTY REDUCTION 66 (Anne Sisak ed.,
2002) [hereinafter CORNWALL, BENEFICIARY, CONSUMER, CITIZEN] (arguing that
citizenship should include participation in government with rights granted by the
State, instead of just as a national identity); Andrea Cornwall, Preface for THE
PARTICIPATION READER xii, xii–xiii (Andrea Cornwall ed., 2000) (explaining that
the human rights approach seeks to expand participation beyond invited
participation to mobilization, insurgency, and struggles for rights and citizenship).
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according to authors such as Clare Ferguson and Julia Håusermann
the right to participation should be seen as the foundational base of
the rights approach since it is the prerequisite to claiming all of the
rest of the human rights.113 The very act of demanding the fulfillment
of one’s rights requires an active subject, who is in control of his or
her life, a participant in his or her own process of development.114
Nevertheless, not just any sort of participation will do the trick. It
is not sufficient for a government only to open up controlled spaces
for opinion-giving or popular consultation for it to claim that it is
applying a human rights approach.115 The value-added of the human
rights approach is that “it offers the possibility of shifting the frame
of participatory interventions away from inviting participation in predetermined spaces to enabling people to define for themselves their
own entry points and strategies for change.”116 A human rights
approach to participation begins with empowerment and then
searches for strategic inroads into the government or other duty
holders.117 It does not try to circumscribe who can participate when
and how depending on the spaces already open within the
government. It is therefore a truly “bottom-up” approach to
development.
In addition to inverting power relationships and requiring
participation, the human rights approach also teaches impatience and
intolerance to poverty and injustice.118 The violation of so-called
113. See CLARE FERGUSON, GLOBAL SOCIAL POLICY PRINCIPLES: HUMAN
RIGHTS & SOCIAL JUSTICE 3, 15 (1999) (stating that democratic participation in
government allows individuals to enforce their own rights and bring claims if they
are violated); JULIA HÅUSERMANN, A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO
DEVELOPMENT 180–81 (1998) (noting that this type of participation is necessary
for sustainable development).
114. See HÅUSERMANN, supra note 113, at 180 (specifying that poor people
need to be involved in the prioritizing of issues, the implementing of solutions, and
the evaluation of the solutions’ effectiveness).
115. See Andrea Cornwall, Locating Citizen Participation, 33 INST. OF DEV.
STUDIES 49, 49 (asserting that people marginalized by the government and society
are also associated with “popular participation”).
116. CORNWALL, BENEFICIARY, CONSUMER, CITIZEN, supra note 112, at 68.
117. See id. at 68, 75 (explaining that predetermined inroads are not nearly as
valuable as enabling citizens to create their own ways to participate in
development).
118. See SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 20 (Sherith Pankratz
ed., 2010) (explaining that under the synthetic approach, the “framing perspective”
calls for social movement leaders and organizations to identify injustices to inspire
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“civil” and “political” rights usually causes immediate indignation
and protest.119 Incidents like the torture of opposition political
leaders, the censorship of the media, and the violent repression of
street protests often lead to immediate and powerful reactions by the
affected actors and other interested parties. Unfortunately, the
existence of poverty, unemployment, and sickness do not always
create the same kind of urgent response.
Here, the human rights approach to development looks to remind
us of the fundamental indivisibility of human rights. As the U.N.
states, “[H]uman rights are indivisible . . . [w]hether of a civil,
cultural, economic, political or social nature, they are all inherent to
the dignity of every human person . . . . Consequently, they all have
equal status as rights, and cannot be ranked, a priori, in hierarchical
order.”120 So called “economic” and “social” rights like the right to
work, social security, education, and health are just as fundamental
as “civil” and “political” rights like the right to protection against
torture, freedom of assembly, and freedom of speech.121 From a
human rights perspective, the absence of medicine or doctors at a
local health clinic is equivalent to the torture of opposition political
leaders.122
collective action).
119. See CHARLES TILLY & SIDNEY TARROW, CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 2, 12–13
(2007) (referring to various historical accounts of protests in reaction to violations
of civil and political rights, such as those following the alleged 2004 “stolen
election” in Ukraine, and more historically, the reaction of the Boston colonists in
the late 1700s which culminated to the dumping of tea into the Boston Harbor); see
also, STAGGENBORG, supra note 118, at 20 (discussing how the synthetic resource
mobilization model views individual discontent as the impetus behind collective
action, as well as an instigator of social change).
120. The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation:
Towards a Common Understanding Among UN Agencies, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS
BASED APPROACHES PORTAL, available at http://hrbaportal.org/the-human-rightsbased-approach-to-development-cooperation-towards-a-common-understandingamong-un-agencies (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
121. See generally id.; Katherine E. Cox, Should Amnesty International Expand
Its Mandate to Cover Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 261, 262 (1999) (asserting that particularly in developing countries,
abuses of civil and political rights cannot be effectively tackled without
simultaneously addressing longstanding economic and social problems).
122. See CAROL BELLAMY, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 2004:
GIRLS, EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT 92 (2003) (stating that the right to health is
governed by human rights principles). Compare The Right to Health, OFFICE OF
THE
U.N.
HIGH
COMM’R
FOR
HUMAN
RTS.
27
(2008),
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What this means is that the violation of economic and social rights
requires immediate and forceful responses.123 If a government
neglects to provide teachers to a local school, the community is
within its right to protest and organize. If an international agency
fails to attend to the negative social consequences of the economic
policies it recommends, the population is entirely justified to call for
the immediate resolution of its grievances.
Finally, the human rights approach is grounded in the idea that the
source of poverty lies in the structure of the power relations that exist
in society.124 In addition to “empowering” the poor, this approach
looks to transform the framework of power in society as a whole.125
In other words, human rights requires “scaling up.” This is most
obvious in the area of political rights. In addition to freedom of
speech and freedom of association, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights also claims that citizens have the right to participate
in government itself through the celebration of democratic
elections.126 It is not enough to “be empowered.” The structure of
political decision-making itself must put citizens in a position of
power.
The same applies for economic and social rights. It is not enough
for citizens to participate in planning local development projects or
speak out against poor service delivery to fulfill the human rights
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet31.pdf (emphasizing that
states are obligated to adopt national health policies and provide adequate
healthcare), with Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46
(Dec. 10, 1984), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm
(declaring that States Parties to the Convention Against Torture must take
appropriate measures to prevent torture).
123. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf (asserting that States Parties that do not
comply to certain obligations under the ICESCR are expected to create a plan of
implementation within two years of ratifying).
124. See OHCHR, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 104, at 9.
125. See CORNWALL, BENEFICIARY, CONSUMER, CITIZEN, supra note 112, at 78
(arguing that simply encouraging impoverished individuals to participate in public
engagement is not enough, but rather, they should be enabled “to exercise agency
through the institutions, spaces and strategies they make and shape for
themselves”).
126. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 21, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1984).
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approach. Citizens should be made direct participants in the wealth
of the national economy as well as in national economic policymaking.127 As this U.N. document on a “Common Understanding” of
the human rights based approach states, programs that comply with
this approach must include “assessment and analysis to identify . . .
the immediate, underlying, and structural causes of the nonrealization of rights.”128 As Cornwall has pointed out, this element of
the human rights approach is so important, because,
[I]n emphasizing obligation and responsibility, the rights-based approach
opens up the possibilities of a renewed focus on the root causes of poverty
and exclusion, and on the relations of power that sustain equity . . . .
Bringing governance squarely into the frame, exclusion becomes in itself
a denial of rights and the basis for active citizens to make demands,
backed by legal instruments.129

The following table summarizes the above-mentioned five central
elements of the human rights approach to development:
Table 1: The Human Rights Approach to Development
Core Concept

Traditional Approach

Human Rights Approach

Service
Provision

Charity/Help

Obligation

The Poor

Beneficiaries/
Consumers

Citizens

Participation

Top-down

Bottom-up

Economic &
Social Rights

Less Urgent than Civil
& Political Rights

Indivisibility of Human
Rights

Power
Structure

Unimportant or Ignored

Central to Overcoming
Poverty

Social accountability initiatives may or may not fall within the
category of human rights approaches to development.130 The fact that
127. See, e.g., BELLAMY, supra note 122, at 93 (advocating that people are
important actors and are “key” in their own development).
128. Id. at 93.
129. See CORNWALL, BENEFICIARY, CONSUMER, CITIZEN, supra note 112, at 67.
130. See Melish, supra note 110, at 71–72 (2010) (explaining that there has
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they have to do with accountability and improving governance does
not guarantee that they also have to do with human rights. A more
accountable government is not necessarily one that approaches the
task of development from a human rights perspective. It is easy to
imagine a government that informed its citizens about and justified
every one of its actions in a pro-active manner and exposed its public
servants to clear sanctions depending on their performance, but still
approached the poor in a paternalistic, charity-based manner.
The involvement of civil society in pro-accountability initiatives
does not necessarily guarantee their human rights component either.
As discussed above, “participation” can take many different forms.
“Beneficiaries” can participate by replacing government officials in
the delivery of goods and services.131 “Consumers” can participate in
service delivery by sending market signals about their preferences. 132
The people at large can “participate” by making their opinions
known or responding to specific invitations made by the
government.133 None of these modalities truly fulfills the promise of
the human rights perspective. This perspective requires a bottom-up
approach to participation in which empowerment comes before
opportunity and rights come before efficiency.
Only when social accountability initiatives are grounded in a
vision of service providers as duty-bearers, that sees the poor as
citizens, stimulates participation from the bottom-up, emphasizes the
indivisibility of human rights, and is oriented towards changing the
overall power structure can we speak of a human rights approach in
action.134 But how can we judge whether this is the case or not? What
been a shift in the human rights approach, and that whereas the “old” human rights
approach was focused on the protection the political rights of individuals from
state apparatuses—and thus far more state-centric—the new approach gives more
power to local administrative units and private actors).
131. See CORNWALL, BENEFICIARY, CONSUMER, CITIZEN, supra note 112, at
11, 17 (commenting that beginning in the 1970s with the passage of legislation,
“beneficiaries” played more active roles in development).
132. See id. at 32 (relaying that market participation will affect economic
activity).
133. See id. at 13 (arguing that poverty and disempowerment cannot be
combated by simply inviting participation in “projects, programmes or processes”
and instead, people must be enabled to create their own spaces for engagement).
134. See generally id. at 60–61 (providing a historical overview of the shift in
development discourse regarding participation towards more of a merging of
participation and good governance, in which government service delivery is more
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are the specific indicators of the presence of a human rights approach
in social accountability initiatives?
For each element of the human rights approach we can design
specific indicators, which will reveal whether the element exists.
First, with regard to the charity (or obligation) criteria, an excellent
indicator is whether formal legal instruments are encouraged as a
means by which citizens can claim their rights.135 The encouragement
of legal recourse demonstrates that service providers are being
conceptualized as duty-bearers, since it is the law that ultimately
grounds the duty to uphold human rights.136 If legal recourse is not
encouraged, this puts in doubt the idea that the service provider is
obligated to perform effectively.
Second, with regard to the beneficiaries/consumer/citizen criteria,
we can examine to what extent the participants in the social
accountability initiatives are encouraged to engage in a broad debate
about the underlying sources of the problems which they encounter
daily in their interaction with the government.137 Are citizens only
expected to give their opinions and participate in the solutions
concerning the delivery of specific services, or are they taken
seriously as political actors who can participate in constructing and
implementing broader national or international solutions?
Third, with regard to the “direction” of participation, are the
participatory mechanisms designed externally and then “imposed” on
the population, or are previously existing community forms of
participation taken as the starting point for the design of the
mechanisms? Is participation carefully controlled and limited to
previously existing spaces or is it encouraged to multiply and expand
beyond these spaces?
responsive to the needs of the poor and attempts to enable the poor to have a say in
the policies that concern their lives).
135. See WALTER EBERLEI, INSTITUTIONALISED PARTICIPATION IN PROCESSES
BEYOND
THE
PRSP
26
(2001),
available
at
http://inef.unidue.de/page/documents/Eberlei_(2001)_-_GTZ_-_Institutionalisation_(engl).pdf
(citing to other authorities to argue that political participation should be “protected
by the rule of law” and that the poor should feel safe to take steps towards
improving their situation through legal means) (internal citations omitted).
136. See, e.g., id. (contending that a functioning judiciary is required to
diminish poverty).
137. E.g., id. at 41 (relating that countries with well-developed participation
include “open and continuous” public debates to address poverty reduction).
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Fourth, are violations of economic, social, and cultural rights
placed at the same level as the violations of political and civil rights?
Specifically, are patience and tolerance to violations of so-called
second generation rights preached, or is the initiative inspired by a
push for immediate action?
Fifth, with regard to the issue of the overarching power structure, a
crucial indicator is whether the actors and forces, which oppose
improving government accountability, are explicitly named and
engaged with or simply not mentioned.138 Insofar as these opposing
forces are not explicitly taken into account, this is an indicator of a
tendency to sweep larger structural problems under the rug.139
The following table (Table 2) summarizes the indicators for each
one of the elements of the human rights approach:
Table 2: Indicators of the Human Rights Approach in Social
Accountability Initiatives
Core Element

Indicator

Service Providers as DutyHolders

Is formal legal recourse encouraged?

Participants as Citizens

Are citizens encouraged to think beyond
immediate and localistic concerns?

Bottom-up Participation

Is participation expansive and does it build
on previously existing practices?

Indivisibility of Human
Rights

Is the initiative inspired by a push for
immediate and urgent action?

Power Structure

Are opposing forces explicitly named and
engaged with?

In general, an important challenge with regard to implementing a
human rights approach is the institutionalization of social
138. Cf. DENA RINGOLD ET AL., CITIZENS AND SERVICE DELIVERY 33 (2011)
(emphasizing generally the importance of the citizens’ right to information
regarding service delivery, including information whether policy makers and
providers are doing their jobs properly).
139. But see id. at 33–34 (suggesting that it is still uncertain whether having
access to an information framework actually improves the quality of public
services).
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accountability initiatives. As Walter Eberlei has written, a certain
“event culture” tends to prevail when the concepts of societal
participation and civic engagement are brought to the table. 140 Many
public officials seem to believe that all that these concepts imply is
the holding of a series of hearings, workshops, and consultations, not
the establishment of a long-term participatory dialogue with civil
society.141
There are three different levels at which participatory mechanisms
can be institutionalized in the state. First, participatory mechanisms
can be built into the strategic plans of government agencies, with
rules and procedures mandated that require “street-level bureaucrats”
to consult or otherwise engage with societal actors.142 Second,
specific government agencies can be created that have the goal of
assuring societal participation in government activities or act as a
liaison in charge of building links with societal actors.143 Third,
participatory mechanisms can be inscribed in law, requiring
individual agencies or the government as a whole to involve societal
actors at specific moments of the public policy process.144
Although the first level of institutionalization is more or less
widespread and the second level is relatively common, the third level
is extremely rare. There are of course some important exceptions,
including the Administrative Procedures Act in the United States,
Bolivia’s Popular Participation Law, Porto Alegre’s Participatory
Budgeting framework, Mexico City’s Citizen Participation Law, and
140. EBERLEI, supra note 135, at 9.
141. See id. at 14–15 (claiming that although in theory poverty reduction
strategies should build on existing political processes to ensure long-term
implementation, in practice, oftentimes these poverty reduction activities are not
structurally integrated and are thus limited and weak).
142. See id. at 15, 16 (advocating for representative participation in which civil
society and private sector actors are involved in processes according to the broad
section of the population they are capable of representing).
143. See Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin, & Evan Mendelson,
Transparency in Public Participation in the Rulemaking Process, U. OF PA. L.
SCH. 18–19 (2009), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/
transparencyReport.pdf (expressing that agencies can relay informal
communications with external actors to administrators to actuate effective
rulemaking).
144. See Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 459
(emphasizing that participatory mechanisms are most effective when fully
institutionalized, meaning that public involvement is within a clear legal structure).
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the wave of freedom of information laws that has swept the world
over the past two decades.145 Nevertheless, these exceptions only
prove the rule that participatory mechanisms are usually vastly
under-institutionalized, depending too much on the ingenuity and
good will of individual bureaucrats.
Why this is the case is more or less evident. Law making under
democratic conditions involves the messy process of legislative
bargaining and a full role for political parties.146 State reformers and
multilateral agencies tend to shy away from such arenas, especially
when they are dominated by opposing parties or factions.147
Therefore, reformers usually settle for executive procedures, special
agencies, or innovative individual bureaucrats to carry out their
participative strategies.
This is a mistake. If dealt with in a creative fashion, partisanship
can be just as effective as isolation in the search for effective
accountability mechanisms.148 It is absolutely crucial to involve
political parties and the legislature to fully institutionalize
participative mechanisms through the law.
In addition to the institutionalization of social accountability
mechanisms in the state, we can also speak of their
institutionalization in society. Good laws, open institutions, and proactive public servants will do very little if civil society itself is not
able to take advantage of these openings. On the one hand, civil
society organizations and groups need to build their capacity to
dialogue with government and hold it to account.149 This endeavor
involves including the education and training of civil society as a
central element of any social accountability initiative.150 On the other
hand, civil society groups ought to band together to assure the long145. See generally id. at 451 (explaining how these governments are addressing
participatory mechanisms).
146. Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 459.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See EBERLEI, supra note 135, at 3 (stating that the participation in political
processes of civil society actors “remains an absolutely essential element” for the
development of poverty-reduction policies).
150. See RINGOLD ET AL., supra note 138, at 41 (affirming that governments
and civil society organizations are using information campaigns to provide citizens
with information regarding their rights and the standards of services they should
expect, in an effort to increase the access and use of these services).
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term continuity and “institutionalization” of social accountability
initiatives.151 With many groups participating in coordinated fashion,
the permanence of the effort is much more likely guaranteed.
Nevertheless, there is such a thing as “over-institutionalization.”152
Once participation is legally recognized and socially organized, it is
also controlled by those forces. Institutionalization can work as a
double-edged sword. In general, the risk is the creation of an elite
class of individuals or civil society organizations who supposedly
speak for the people but do not have social base or legitimacy to
back up this voice.153
The debate with regard to the nature of institutionalized
participation is an old one, going back to discussions of the
corporatist form of interest mediation during the 1970s. At that time
the important distinction was made between “state corporatism” and
“societal corporatism.” The former category includes those states
who created new labor and business “corporations” out of whole
cloth and controlled them from above.154 The latter category refers to
those states in which previously existing labor and business groups
negotiated their entrance into the state from a position of power.155
A similar distinction can be made with respect to the
institutionalization of civic engagement for accountability. When this
institutionalization leaves the state with the power to divide, co-opt,
and control civil society we have reached the problematic situation of
“over-institutionalization,” or “statist institutionalization.”156 When it
empowers previously existing societal actors to make their voices
heard and to apply sanctions on misbehaving or ineffective
governments, we have the much more productive case of what can be
151. Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 459.
152. Cf. id. (arguing that decentralization of government does not
“automatically” improve government accountability).
153. See id. (asserting that decentralization and the increase of local units, while
bringing the government closer to its citizens, actually may reinforce inequalities).
154. See Philippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, 36 REV.
POLITICS 85, 104–05 (1974) (defining state corporatism as connected to political
systems in which local units are “tightly subordinated” to a central power).
155. See id. (describing societal corporatism as “imbedded” in political systems
with autonomous units).
156. See Melish, supra note 110, at 71 (demonstrating former human rights
approaches as responding to state infringements on individual liberties, resulting in
a confrontational discourse).
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called “societal institutionalization.”157
In addition to being under-institutionalized, another risk is for proaccountability initiatives grounded in civic engagement to be “underinvolved” or too “externalist.” Consultations and workshops are
common and protests and elections are frequent; but it is very
difficult to find cases in which societal actors are “invited into the
kitchen.”158 For instance, transparency laws often only give access to
documents that report on concluded processes, not permitting
citizens to have access to information about the process that led up to
the decision or action.159 Governments usually claim the need to
protect personal privacy and national security as their major reasons
for resisting a policy of total transparency.160 Although this may
often be the case, governments also frequently use such claims only
as excuses to hide uncomfortable information from the public eye.161
Nevertheless, there is a limit to the extent to which citizens as
agents of accountability can be invited into the core of the state.
Nuria Cunill Grau has stated that “[c]o-management is irreconcilable
with control [and t]he efficacy of [social control] is directly
dependent on the independence and the autonomy that societal actors

maintain with respect to state actors.”162 According to this point of
157. See Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 458–
59 (asserting that reformers should focus on involving civil society earlier in the
design of participatory mechanisms rather than waiting for the government to
design the mechanisms in a top-down manner).
158. See EBERLEI, supra note 135, at 3 (explaining that a majority of cases
involve consultations and that collaborations, on the other hand, have been rare).
See generally Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at
459.
159. See John M. Ackerman & Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global
Explosion of Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 99 (2006)
(stating that most transparency and freedom of information laws are more
restrictive).
160. See id. at 101 (listing typical exemptions to freedom of information laws as
including protection of national security, personal privacy, public security,
commercial secrets, and internal deliberations).
161. See id. at 105 (citing to other authorities to indicate that some governments
act disingenuously when they allude to issues such as privacy and national
security) (internal citations omitted).
162. Nuria Cunill Grau, Responsabilización por el Control Social, CENTRO
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view, pro-accountability initiatives based on civic engagement need
to defend the autonomy of society.
There is indeed a point at which individual citizens or civil society
groups go so far into the state that they end up being consumed by
the monster that they were supposed to control.163 Funding is a
crucial issue here. Insofar as the government funds in a discretionary
manner individuals and groups who are holding it accountable, their
ability to exercise their pro-accountability function is
compromised.164
Nevertheless, we should not take this argument too far. An
organization that receives resources from the government is not
necessarily “bought off.” If resources are disbursed transparently and
with the use of objective criteria the fear of cooptation is
significantly reduced.165 The numerous existing public universities,
public investigation commissions, and government-funded citizen
councils demonstrate that public money and public criticism can go
hand-in-hand. In addition, there are numerous ways in which societal
actors can be invited inside the state without any money exchanging
hands, including legal figures such as “social audits” and “citizen
comptrollers.”166 The General, State, and District councils of
Mexico’s Federal Election Institute are excellent examples of how
societal actors can enforce accountability from within the state
itself.167
LATINOAMERICANO DE ADMINISTRACIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO 6 (2000),
available at http://www.defensoria.org.co/red/anexos/pdf/08/responsabilizacion
_cs.pdf.
163. See Henry Lucas et al., Research on the Current State of PRS Monitoring
Systems 17 (Inst. of Dev. Studies, Discussion Paper No. 382, 2004), available at
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Research-on-the-Current-Stateof-PRS-Monitoring-Systems.pdf (emphasizing that it is important for civil society
organizations to maintain their autonomy and engage with government without
conceding their values to prevent a loss of credibility in their roles as watchdogs
over state actions).
164. See id. at 20 (warning against joint-monitoring activities involving civil
society organizations that are dependent on government funding, and suggesting,
in the alternative, that external actors such as international NGOs may be more
effective).
165. See Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 451
(demonstrating, for example, that in the city of Porto Alegre, robust negotiations
and a weighted voting system have ensured a fair distribution of resources).
166. Id. at 451.
167. Ackerman, Organismos Autónomos, supra note 89, at 12; see also
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“Depth of involvement” is frequently related to “level of
Institutionalization” insofar as the closer societal actors get to the
core of the state, the more their behavior is usually regulated. 168 But
this is by no means a guarantee. Relatively external forms of
participation, like public consultations of large infrastructure
projects, can be required by law, while many civil society
organizations or movements are able to reach into the very core of
the state even without legal permission, as when informal but
powerful bargaining tables are set up between guerrilla leaders and
government officials.169 These are therefore two distinct dimensions
and each needs to be given its due attention in the design of social
accountability mechanisms.
There is also a tendency for participatory pro-accountability
mechanisms to only involve a small group of “well behaved” NGOs,
middle class professionals, and centrist politicians.170 The unspoken
fear is that the participation of broad-based grassroots movements,
uneducated citizens, and leftist politicians will only make things
more difficult. The fundamental problem here is one of
communication and value sharing.171 On the one hand,
communication with the “well behaved” group is much easier
because they usually speak the same language, both literally and
figuratively, and have often even studied at the same universities as
the public officials. On the other hand, language, class, and cultural
barriers make it much more difficult to truly listen to and understand
Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 452 (stating that
the General Council, for example, acts as both the horizontal accountability agency
the principal directive body for the IFE).
168. But see Marie Gildemyn, Towards an Understanding of Civil Society
Organisations’ Involvement in Monitoring and Evaluation 1, 18–19 (Inst. of Dev.
Policy and Mgmt., Discussion Paper No. 2011-03, 2011) (stating that the extent to
which civil society organizations are involved in the “core” of government is
different from the level of institutionalization as a result of the organizations’ goal
of maintaining their autonomy).
169. See Teresa La Porte, The Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Non-State Actors
and the Public Diplomacy Concept 1 (ISA Ann. Convention, 2012) (demonstrating
the effectiveness of movements without legitimacy through examples such as the
Arab Spring and the global “#occupywallstreet”).
170. See Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 458–
59 (contending that this tendency calls for “the full inclusion” of all citizens in the
central activities of the government rather than this exclusion).
171. See id. at 459 (asserting that state reformers and multilateral agencies
avoid the “messy process” of the intense negotiations of lawmaking).
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the “raucous” group.172 Clear proposals are often misinterpreted as
destructive criticism and the need to be taken into account is
frequently confused with a desire to disrupt. The simplest option is
therefore to only open up participation to those one already
understands.
This is clearly a mistake. As Eberlei argues, “The circle of
participating actors established must be gradually and systematically
expanded, in order to broaden the scope of dialogue and make it
largely inclusive,”173 Such broad-based participation is crucial for
three reasons. First, civic engagement for accountability is usually
more effective precisely when government officials do not know
what to expect from civil society.174 When public officials and
society actors form part of the same “epistemic community,”
officials can anticipate exactly when, where, and how they will be
observed, judged, and held accountable. Some level of predictability
is positive insofar as it allows for coherent long-term planning.175 But
too much predictability is dangerous insofar as it tends towards
complicity.176 Social accountability can be most effective when it
keeps government officials on their toes.
Second, “well behaved” civil society groups are usually
considered so because they “trust” government to do a good job.177
Although some level of social trust in government is necessary for
national cohesion, too much trust can be counterproductive. As
Catalina Smulovitz has pointed out, it is often the case that “the
social trust that results from value-sharing weakens citizens’
oversight and control capacities of what rulers do, and increases, in
turn, the chances of opportunistic actions by one of them.”178
172. But see Smulovitz, supra note 98, at 181 (stating that people’s diversity
does not automatically impede “control or attempts to impose costs”).
173. EBERLEI, supra note 135, at 15.
174. See Smulovitz, supra note 98, at 181 (arguing that the social trust created
by value sharing actually increases the control of the government officials and
creates opportunities for officials to act opportunistically, thereby negating
accountability).
175. But see id. (suggesting that consensus on values does not necessarily
ensure long-term survival of the law).
176. See id. (emphasizing that social trust can weaken the citizens’ oversight
over government officials).
177. See id. at 180 (stating that some find that societal trust is necessary for
political cooperation).
178. Id. at 181.
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“Distrust” is one of the most powerful motivating forces for the
vigilant observation of government and it is often the “raucous”
groups that score high on this criteria.179 In the end, “autonomous
civil society is [not so] important because citizens share values that
sustain the benefits of self-restraint . . . [it] is important because it
implies the existence of multiple external eyes with interests in the
enforcement of law and denunciation of non-obedience.”180
Third, pro-accountability initiatives that involve a wide range of
interests and ideological positions are much more legitimate than
those operated by a small, handpicked group of professionals.181
Expanding the circle of participation is clearly a challenge, but it is
the only way to achieve broad-based acceptance and ownership in
such pro-accountability initiatives. We should be careful not to fall
prey to depoliticized or neutral ideas of civil society that see
“cooperative” or “moderate” forms of social organization as the only
ones that can positively influence the construction of accountability
arrangements.182
In the end, we should question the commonly accepted idea that
the absence of partisanship and political conflict is the only fertile
ground for neutrality and accountability. Professionalism and
independence are necessary but by no means sufficient to assure the
long-term survival of accountability. To survive, pro-accountability
structures need to be legitimated by society both at their founding
moment and during their everyday operations.183 This requires the
multiplication, not the reduction, of “external eyes” and the
diversification, not unification, of political and ideological
perspectives.184 Indeed, sometimes the most effective strategy for
state reformers might be to stimulate dynamic social movements and
social protest and let them take the lead in pressuring and
undermining the power of recalcitrant elements of the state.
179. See id.
180. But see id. at 171.
181. See EBERLEI, supra note 135, at 15 (stating that the expansion of the group
of actors is necessary to broaden dialogue and increase inclusivity).
182. See Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 453–
54 (suggesting that more effective reform comes from more diversity of political
positions rather than political neutrality, as exemplified by electoral reform in
Mexico).
183. EBERLEI, supra note 135, at 5.
184. Smulovitz, supra note 98, 171.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I have argued in favor of a transformation of both
the theory and practice of international anti-corruption and proaccountability reform. To implement successful strategies, we should
break with the conventional wisdom based in a minimalist
understanding of corruption and a bureaucratic approach to policy. In
its place, we should develop new expansive visions of accountability
and give particular emphasis to the role of civil society. Additionally,
when considering society-based initiatives, the most fruitful strategy
is to take up a human rights based approach. Otherwise, we risk
running into the same problems that affect more traditional
strategies.
I began my discussion by proposing a new definition of
accountability as a “pro-active process by which public officials
inform about and justify their plans of action, their behavior and
results and are sanctioned accordingly.” This definition breaks with
the biases of understandings grounded in more elemental
bureaucratic transparency and sets the stage for understanding
corruption as a symptom of a breakdown of state-society relations
instead of just due to administrative failure. In the first section, I also
outlined the central failures of electoral democracy as an
accountability mechanism. This is important to carve out theoretical
space for developing innovative ways for citizens to participate in
improving governance, beyond electoral participation.
The following section then identified society-based accountability
strategies within the broader schema of different administrative
reforms. This was then immediately followed by an extensive
discussion of the principal strengths and weakness of social
accountability initiatives. To confront the weaknesses and build on
the strengths, I propose focusing specifically on a series of key
issues, including identifying government service providers as dutyholders, understanding beneficiaries of government programs as
citizens, valuing bottom-up participation, understanding the
indivisibility of human rights, and engaging with the broader power
structures. The challenge is to avoid using civil society to help
government avoid its responsibilities and instead enable social
mobilization to pressure government to operate more efficiently and
effectively.

